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This paper examines the nexus between news coverage on inflation and households’
inflation expectations. In doing so, we test the epidemiological foundations of the sticky
information model (Carroll, 2003, 2006). We use both aggregate and household-level data
from the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan. We highlight a fundamental
disconnection between news on inflation, consumers’frequency of expectation updating and
the accuracy of their expectations. Our evidence provides at best weak support to the
epidemiological framework, as most of the consumers who update their expectations do not
revise them towards professional forecasters’mean forecast.
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1 Introduction
The rational expectations revolution that has swept through the economics profession in the
1970s has shaped macroeconomic modelling ever since. Nevertheless, rational expectations have
often been criticized based on their inadequacy to account for a realistic process of economic
forecasting. In response to this criticism, recent years have borne witness to alternative theories
of expectation formation, whose common trait consists of relaxing the set of strong assump-
tions imposed by the rational expectations paradigm. One of such novel approaches assumes
that information is sticky and disseminates slowly throughout the population, so that economic
agents revise their expectations periodically. Carroll (2003, 2006) (henceforth, Carroll) has put
forward an epidemiological mechanism of expectation formation, according to which consumers
update their expectations from the media, which are assumed to transmit professional fore-
casters’projections. The resulting framework is consistent with the intuition behind the sticky
information model of Mankiw and Reis (2001, 2002).
Carroll examines inflation and unemployment forecasts collected by the University of Michi-
gan’s Survey Research Center. He shows that households revise their expectations towards the
mean forecast from the Survey of Professional Forecasters, which he claims to be rational. The
estimated absorption rate is rather low, with only a fourth (third) of the agents updating their
inflation (unemployment) forecasts in every quarter.1 He also provides empirical support to a
main implication of the model, that is greater news coverage induces ‘more rational’household
forecasts. In fact, he shows that higher dissemination of news narrows the gap between the
mean forecast from the Michigan Survey and that of professional forecasters.
This paper tests the epidemiological theory of expectation formation. From a methodological
viewpoint, one of its main novelties consists of exploiting both aggregate and household-level
data from the Michigan Survey. We primarily focus on Carroll’s corollary that more news stories
imply that people are better informed and produce better forecasts. To this end, we complement
Carroll’s index of newspapers coverage with Michigan Survey data on consumers’perception of
favorable and unfavorable price developments in the period before the interview. These data
allow us to compute a direct measure of the flow of news on prices that consumers have heard,
1Doepke et al. (2008) estimate Carroll’s sticky information model of inflation expectations with data from
Italy, Germany, UK, and France. They propose two alternative parameterizations of the sticky information
model that differ in the stationarity assumptions about the underlying series. On average, European households
revise their forecasts once every 18 months when stationarity applies. Otherwise, the VECM analysis shows that
expectation updating takes place on a yearly basis.
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as opposed to the index of newspapers coverage, which is not necessarily informative about the
actual degree of receptiveness to publicly available information on prices. A surprising result is
that both available and perceived news stories do not help at restricting the forecast gap between
consumers’mean forecast and that of the professional forecasters, but rather widen it. Once
we account for the content of the information that disseminates throughout the population, it
turns out that unfavorable news (i.e., higher prices) exert a (positive) impact on the forecast
gap, while favorable news (i.e., lower prices) have either no statistically significant impact or
weakly contribute at reducing consumers’expectation bias. Overall, these results stand in sharp
contrast with the theoretical apparatus put forward by Carroll.
The analysis with household-level data represents the core of the paper. We show that an
average of about 75% of the respondents revise their inflation forecasts with respect to their
first interview. This figure is considerably greater than the average fraction of respondents that
have heard some news on prices (i.e., 5.8%). Also the absorption rate estimated by Carroll is
considerably lower than the updating frequency we derive from household-level data. The micro-
data from the Michigan Survey give us the opportunity of addressing this inconsistency and
examining the epidemiological foundations of the sticky information model in greater detail,
as they contain explicit information about the size and direction of consumers’ expectation
updating. We distinguish between respondents that adjust their forecasts towards and away
from the professional forecasters’ mean expectation. Surprisingly, survey participants split
evenly in the two categories. Most importantly, accessing some recent information on prices does
not necessarily reflect into more accurate forecasts, though it certainly raises the chances that
consumers revise their expectations. Nevertheless, expectation updating does not systematically
occur in the ‘right’direction. These results are generally in line with the tendencies reported
by Curtin (2005) in the analysis of both time-series and panel data from the Michigan Survey,
though no information about news on prices is exploited in this study.2
Our analysis suggests that just a small fraction of consumer forecasts can be explained
according to the epidemiological model. Moreover, it appears that households do not make
the best use of the information they perceive, as they persistently deviate from professional
forecasters’mean expectation, displaying no tendency to adjust their forecasts appropriately.
One possible interpretation is that news transmitted by the media distort consumers’expec-
2According to this study, consumers do not effi ciently use all available information and display staggered
updating of their information set. Moreover, increases in the rate of inflation have a much larger impact than
declines on inflation expectations.
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tations, as they may contain judgmental assessments of professional forecasters’views. As a
consequence, media reports could be biased and the epidemiological mechanism results as a
channel that transmits distorted expectations. This factor could also explain why the degree of
perception of unfavorable news on prices is significantly higher than that of favorable ones, and
why the accuracy of consumers’expectations decreases in the volume of negative news being
perceived. We believe these results should lead academics and policy makers altogether to re-
consider the role of information dissemination in stimulating consumers’expectation updating.
Most importantly, they should serve as a useful guideline to envisage communication strategies
and channels capable of ensuring that private expectations are well anchored.
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows: Section 2 describes the data; Section 3
explores the nexus between expectation updating and news, stressing the discrepancies between
available and perceived news on prices; Section 4 explores household-level data from the Survey
of Consumer Attitudes and Behavior. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data and Preliminary Evidence
We employ both aggregate and household-level data, though greater emphasis will be posed on
the micro-econometric evidence. Household-level data contain information on a wide range of
factors that influence consumers’expectations. As such, they allow us to explore the process of
expectation updating in greater detail. In this section we describe the key features of the dataset
and report some preliminary evidence on households’ and professional forecasters’ inflation
expectations, as well as on the newspapers index proposed by Carroll and a novel measure of
perceived news on prices.
2.1 Inflation Expectations
In the estimation of his model Carroll proxies household expectations with the mean inflation
forecast from the Survey of Consumer Attitudes and Behavior, which is conducted by the Survey
Research Center (SRC) at the University of Michigan. The Michigan Survey (henceforth, MS)
has been available on a monthly basis since January 1978.3 The short rotating panel design
represents its main peculiarity: 40% of prior respondents are re-interviewed in every round,
3Over the whole sample, the survey covers a monthly average of 575 households, with a peak of 1479 respon-
dents in 1978M11 and a minimum of 492 in 1992M11. A montly average of about 500 respondents has been
inteviewed since 1987M1.
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the remaining 60% being initial interviews from a random sub-sample of the telephone-owning
mainland US population. Two relevant questions about expected changes in the price level
are addressed to each participant: (i) first, they are asked whether they expect prices to go
up, go down or stay the same in the next 12 months; (ii) second, they are asked to provide a
quantitative statement about the expected change.4
As to professional forecasts, Carroll employs the mean inflation expectations from the Survey
of Professional Forecasters (henceforth, SPF). The SPF, currently conducted by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, has collected and summarized forecasts from leading private
forecasting firms since 1968. The survey questionnaire is distributed once a quarter and asks
participants for quarter-by-quarter forecasts, spanning the current and next five quarters.5
Insert Figure 1 here
The present study explores both aggregate and household-level data from the MS. The
analysis at the aggregate level (Section 3) relies on quarterly data over the time window
1978Q1-2011Q2, while Section 4 reports evidence based on MS monthly micro-data data over
the 1978M1-2011M2 period.6 In the analysis at the aggregate level we take the MS and SPF
mean forecasts as indicators of central tendency in inflation forecasting, so as to be coherent
with Carroll’s framework.7 ,8 Figure 1 reports household and professional mean forecasts against
CPI inflation.9 Both surveys under-predict rising inflation in the first part of the sample, though
their predictive accuracy improves remarkably during the subsequent disinflation. This is prob-
ably due to the credibility the Federal Reserve had acquired in the early 1980s, when the Federal
4 If a respondent expects prices to stay the same, the interviewer must make sure she does not actually expect
that prices will change at the same rate they have changed in the past 12 months.
5The SPF was previously carried out as a joint product of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
and the American Statistical Association (ASA) on a wide variety of economic variables, including GDP growth,
various measures of inflation and the rate of unemployment. For more details on the SPF, see Croushore (1998).
6The SPF forecast of CPI inflation is only available from 1981Q3. Therefore, from 1978Q1 to 1981Q3 we
proxy the CPI inflation mean forecast from the SPF with the GDP deflator mean forecast. The two series are
generally very close. However, for robustness purposes and to exclude the disinflation at the beginning of the
sample and the ongoing period of financial and macroeconomic turmoil, Appendix A replicates the entire analysis
on the 1984-2004 sub-sample. The results are virtually unchanged.
7One could argue that the median is less sensitive to outliers. In fact, cross-sectional variation of forecasts
in the MS is substantial, with some unplausible responses. Moreover, Thomas (1999) shows the median of the
MS to be a better forecaster than its mean. Nevertheless, Carroll’s framework delivers predictions only for the
mean and not for the median. For completeness, we replicate the analysis at the aggregate level using the median
forecasts from the two surveys. Additional results are available in Appendix C and show no qualitative difference
with respect to the main results reported in the paper.
8Given the presence of some implausible responses it is advisable to exclude outliers. Curtin (1996) shows
that alternative truncation rules lead to nearly unchanged results. In the analysis of household-level data we opt
for a truncation at -5% and +30%: this yields 228,837 interviews over the 1978M1-2011M2 period.
9 Inflation expectations carried out at time t are graphed at the realized date (i.e., t + 4), so as to enhance
comparability with the forecast target.
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Reserve System was headed by Paul Volcker. From 1984 onwards expectations appear reason-
ably anchored, although they often fail to match periods of low inflation and, most notably, the
2009Q1-2009Q3 deflation.
2.2 News on Inflation
A direct implication of Carroll’s view is that more news stories should imply that people are
better informed and produce better forecasts. He proposes a formal statistical test of whether
greater news coverage is associated with ‘more rational’household forecasts. The econometric
model employed to test this hypothesis is at the core of our analysis and requires reliable
indicators of the flow of news on inflation the public is confronted with. Carroll computes a
yearly index of the intensity of news coverage in the New York Times and the Washington Post.
We compute a similar index for each newspaper and each quarter since 1980Q1 (i.e., the year
that both newspapers have been included in the LexisNexis database), searching for stories
that contain words beginning with the root ‘inflation’ (so that also words like ‘inflationary’
or ‘inflation-fighting’would be detected). For each newspaper, the number of stories is then
converted to an index by dividing the number of articles about inflation in a given quarter by
the total number of articles in the same quarter.10
We complement the newspapers index with a measure of the actual perception of new
information about prices. This choice is motivated by a number of important considerations.
The accuracy of a proxy based on the intensity of news coverage on national newspapers can be
questioned on different grounds. Blinder and Krueger (2004) suggest that consumers mostly rely
on information about inflation from the TV, followed by local and then national newspapers.11 It
is also plausible to expect that the volume of news about inflation does not necessarily match the
flow of information that is actually assimilated by the public. In fact, a non-trivial discrepancy
could result from the interplay of two mutually reinforcing effects: (i) news from the media do
not necessarily reach the public uniformly and (ii) the connection between news and inflation
expectations is likely to be affected by consumers’receptiveness to such news and the capacity to
process new information. Indeed, Sims (2003) emphasizes the presence of information-processing
10A potential problem connected with this type of search is that the resulting index may include articles that
do not primarily cover US inflation. Thus, we test the robustness of this methodology by restricting the search
to articles that cover just US inflation. Moreover, we exclude articles with less than 120 words, so as to rule out
short comments and summaries, searching for words beginning with the root "inflation" that are located either
in the headline or among the "index terms". The resulting index yields to virtually unchanged evidence.
11 It should also be stressed that over the last decade the internet has probably become a main source of news
about various economic statistics.
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constraints that could be compatible with such ineffi ciencies. In light of these considerations,
it is advisable to complement the analysis with a variable that accounts for consumers’actual
perception of the information reported in the media. Household-level data from the MS allow us
to compute the fraction of respondents that have heard of recent changes in prices. Information
about the content of such news is also available, with the survey participants indicating whether
they have heard about positive or negative changes. Specifically, the following question is
addressed to each household: "During the last few months, have you heard of any favorable
or unfavorable changes in business conditions?"12 In case of an affi rmative response, a second
question is asked: "What did you hear?" To address this query, the respondent is presented with
a number of options regarding the type of business conditions she might have heard about, such
as government, unemployment, prices, consumer demand, stock market, credit, trade deficit.
She is allowed to name at most two of these options. Should prices be one of the selected options,
she can reply either (i) "Favorable News: Lower Prices" or (ii) "Unfavorable News: Higher
Prices."13 ,14 It is important to mention that different perceptions about price movements could
result both from the content of news reports being released through the media, as well as by
the tone of the assessment and judgement about news being reported. In fact, Lamla and Lein
(2008) suggest that newspapers may have an incentive to favor bad news over good ones, so as
to catch more attention from the readers and increase their sales. The analysis presented in the
remainder of the paper provides statistical and econometric support to this claim.
Insert Figures 2 and 3 here
Figure 2 reports the fraction of MS respondents that have heard news about prices, together
with the newspapers index and CPI inflation. The two news-related series are poorly correlated.
Moreover, the newspapers index displays weaker co-movement with the rate of inflation, as
compared to our measure of ‘perceived news’. The latter is more volatile, especially when abrupt
changes in the rate of inflation occur, though in the last part of the sample it displays sizeable
12Consumer sentiment indeces as those that can be derived from household-level data on the perception of
business conditions have been usefully employed in various studies. For instance, Souleles (2004) presents an
application on consumption behavior.
13Should the interviewer perceive that the respondent has an uncorrect understanding of the question on
perceived changes in prices, a further question is asked that aims at making sure that the responses "Favorable
News: Lower Prices" and "Unfavorable News: Higher Prices" are interpreted correctly.
14MS respondents primarily report about news on unemployment, followed by news on the government (elec-
tions) and then prices. It is important to stress that 41% of the respondents report having heard no news at all
and that in 28% of the cases only one option is reported. This is to say that, on average, only 31% of the respon-
dents are confronted with a potentially binding limit of two options. Therefore, though some underreporting may
affect our measure of perceived changes in prices, this is not likely to be induced by the limit of two responses.
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fluctuations that neither actual inflation nor the newspapers index present. This probably
reflects higher uncertainty characterizing consumers’ information during the recent period of
marked macroeconomic and financial turmoil. When looking at the perceived tone of the news
consumers have heard (Figure 3), it can be noted that the fraction of consumers that have
heard favorable news almost constantly lie below the fraction of those that report unfavorable
news. The latter proportion of respondents is more volatile and tends to peak when inflation
accelerates. As expected on a priori grounds, the percentage of agents reporting favorable news
is negatively (yet weakly) correlated with the rate of inflation. The sign of this correlation is
reversed when considering the fraction of respondents that have heard negative news, which
indicates that households pay attention to news coverage mostly during periods characterized
by relatively higher and more volatile inflation.15 According to Hamilton (2004) and Soroka
(2006), a common finding in literature on news coverage is that there is more reporting of
bad news than good ones. In fact, this type of asymmetry is in line with the prospect theory
pioneered by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), as agents tend to manifest higher receptiveness
towards bad news on prices, as compared to good news.
3 News and Expectation Updating: Evidence from Aggregate
Data
According to the epidemiological foundations of the sticky information model, consumers update
their forecasts from news reports, which are influenced by the expectations of the professional
forecasters.16 The key assumption is that news spread slowly across agents, reaching only a
fraction of the population in each period. Carroll examines his model’s ability to explain the





t+3|t−1 + vt, (1)
where πCt+4|t denotes the time t mean MS forecast of time t+ 4 inflation and π
F
t+4|t is the SPF
mean forecast. We estimate (1) by OLS and report the estimation results in Table 1. Overall
15Note that in the last part of the sample higher volatility in the measure of (perceived) unfavorable news is
not accompanied by higher volatility in the rate of inflation. Such a de-linking in the behavior of the two series
probably reflects the emergence of additional determinants of consumers’receptiveness to news about inflation, as
well as the substantial increase in the volume of economic reporting on different aspects of the ongoing financial
and macroeconomic turmoil.
16Mankiw and Reis (2001, 2002) envisage a similar framework. They assume that agents update their forecasts
only occasionally, due to the presence of an explicit cost to obtain and process information.
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our evidence is qualitatively in line with Carroll, as the rate of absorption we estimate implies
that about a fourth of the MS participants update their forecasts in every quarter. An impor-
tant difference with the benchmark study is that the proposition α1+α2 = 1 can be rejected at
standard levels of statistical confidence. Thus, we reject the key model’s prediction that house-
holds’mean expectations should be a simple weighted average between the current ‘rational’
(or newspaper) forecast and last period’s mean inflation expectations.17 We also expand the set
of regressors in Equation (1) with the most recently published annual inflation rate as of time
t. As in Carroll, the past inflation rate exerts a negative impact, though its coeffi cient is not
statistically significant.
Insert Table 1 here
The results so far are somehow supportive of the epidemiological process of expectation
formation. However, an indirect test of the model’s ability to fit the data can be envisaged
by comparing the estimates of α1 in Equation (1) with the actual degree of receptiveness to
news displayed by the MS participants. In this respect survey data reflect a higher degree of
information stickiness, as compared with the indirect measure of updating frequency obtained
by Carroll. On average, only 5.8% of the interviewees report having heard news about prices
in each quarter. Such a discrepancy emphasizes the need to distinguish between ‘available’and
‘perceived’news for a reliable assessment of the relationship between news coverage of inflation,
staggered updating of expectations and consumers’predictive accuracy. To this end, we examine
the corollary that greater news coverage should be associated with ‘more rational’household
forecasts. As a formal procedure to test for this, Carroll fits an OLS regression of the squared






, on the intensity of
news coverage of inflation, NEWSNt :
GAPSQt = γ0 + γ1NEWS
N
t + µt. (2)
A negative γ1 implies that an increase in the volume of news induces an alignment of consumers’
expectations to the SPF mean forecast. We propose a general model to account for the joint
17Nunes (2009) finds similar evidence.
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effect of perceived and available news, as well as for their potential interaction:









GAPt = {GAPSQt, GAPSQ∗t } ,
where NEWSPt is the fraction of MS respondents that have heard news about prices. As
exposed above, we interpret this measure as an explicit indicator of the actual flow of information
assimilated by the public, as compared with the newspapers index employed by Carroll.18 To
test the robustness of our results we also consider an alternative measure of expectation bias,
which depends on the distance between the time tMS mean forecast of inflation at time t+4 and




. In fact, GAPSQ does not account
for the fact that professional forecasters may not form expectations rationally, as indicated by
a number of studies (e.g., Roberts, 1998, Lanne et al., 2009 and Nunes, 2009).
Insert Table 2 here
Surprisingly, estimating (3) and various alternative specifications points to a positive and
statistically significant relationship between the expectation gap and either measure of the flow
of news on inflation (see Table 2).19 Therefore, a rise in the fraction of ‘informed’consumers
increases the distance between the MS and SPF mean forecasts, a result that stands in sharp
contrast with Carroll (2003). When accounting for the joint effect of NEWSPt and NEWS
N
t ,
only the former exerts a positive impact on the expectation gap, while the coeffi cient attached
to NEWSNt is either not statistically different from zero or barely significant. Finally, we check
whether any interaction is at work between newspapers’coverage and households’receptiveness
to news about inflation, introducing the interaction term NEWSPt × NEWSNt in the set of
regressors. The additional regressor explains most of the variability in GAPSQt, though its
coeffi cient is only significant at the 10% level. As to NEWSPt and NEWS
N
t , they both exert a
18Note that NEWSPt proxies the amount of news heard before the inflation forecast is carried out. This allows
us to avoid the impact of reverse causation.
19 Importantly, we reach the same conclusions by regressing the expectation gap over a constant and the
newspapers index NEWSNt . These results are not overturned if we consider the time window examined by
Carroll (additional results are available, upon request, from the authors). By contrast, it should be noted that
Carroll’s estimates are not robust in this sense, as he shows that excluding the first year of the SPF mean forecast
from the sample may affect the statistical significance of the estimated impact of news on the expectation gap.
It should also be noted that Carroll uses a yearly index in regressions involving quarterly data. Our estimates
do not suffer from this type of inconsistency, as we compute a quarterly newspapers index.
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negative impact, though their coeffi cients are not statistically different from zero.20 This comes
as no surprise, given that both measures of news present positive correlations with GAPSQt.
Nevertheless it should be noted that perceived news present greater correlation with either
measure of prediction bias and dominate their correlations with the interaction term.21
3.1 Asymmetric Effects of Favorable and Unfavorable News on Prices
We now focus on a second dimension of the relationship between news on inflation and expec-
tation updating, which consists of accounting for the perceived content of the news consumers
have heard of. Doms and Morin (2004) show that media coverage is important in that it affects
households’perception of the economy in at least three ways. First, media affects sentiment
by informing consumers about economic data and professional opinions. Second, the greater
the volume of news about the economy, the greater the likelihood that consumers update their
expectations. These channels are explicitly at work in Carroll’s framework. Doms and Morin
(2004) point to a third channel, suggesting that consumers receive a signal about the economy
through the tone of economic reporting.22 This section is aimed at disentangling the differ-
ential impact that favorable and unfavorable news on prices may exert on consumers’forecast
accuracy and the frequency at which they revise their inflation forecasts. We first examine the
existence of potential asymmetries in the rate of absorption, comparing situations in which the
volume of (perceived) negative news is greater than that of positive ones, and viceversa. The
following equation is estimated by OLS:
πCt+4|t =
[




αU2 It + αF2 (1− It)
]
πCt+3|t−1 + vt, (4)
where It is an indicator function, whose value equals one when NEWSP,Ut > NEWS
P,F
t —
i.e. when the fraction of MS respondents that report unfavorable news on prices (NEWSP,Ut )
is greater than the portion of those reporting about favorable news (NEWSP,Ft ) — and zero
otherwise. The next step consists of disentangling the impact of unfavorable news from that of
20When assuming GAPSQ∗t as the dependent variable, the interaction term has no statistically significant
impact, while NEWSPt exerts a stronger positive impact than NEWS
N
t , whose effect is only significant at the
10% level.
21The correlation between GAPSQt and NEWSPt (NEWS
N













is not statistically different from
zero. Table B1 in Appendix B reports pairwise correlations among the variables employed in the regression
analysis of Section 3.
22According to Sims (2003), rational inattention provides an explanation why the tone and volume of economic
reporting affect sentiment beyond the economic information contained in the reporting.
11
favorable ones on the distance between MS and SPF mean forecasts. The following equation is
estimated:








t + µt. (5)
Insert Table 3 here
Estimating (4) returns no particular form of asymmetry in the way favorable and unfavorable
news affect consumers’expectation updating (see Table 3(a)). The estimated rates of absorption
do not vary significantly depending on consumers’ perception and are quantitatively in line
with the estimates of (1). By contrast, we detect some relevant asymmetries when exploring
the impact of positive and negative changes in prices on consumers’expectation bias. Table
3(b) shows that while favorable news exert a negative —yet not statistically significant —impact
on the expectation gap, unfavorable ones tend to enlarge it.23 Thus, we cannot appreciate a
negative impact of news on the expectation gap even when consumers’overall perception is more
pessimistic and their forecasts should be more accurate, or at least reflect higher attentiveness
to economic reporting. Also Lamla and Lein (2008) report similar evidence based on German
data on inflation expectations, while Dräger (2011) obtains analogous results in the analysis of
both expected and perceived inflation in Sweden. These facts certainly deserve to be examined
in further detail. The next section investigates these issues with the support of household-level
data.
4 News and Expectation Updating: Evidence from Household-
Level Data
The MS household-level data provide us with a further opportunity to test Carroll’s microfoun-
dation of the sticky information model. To this end, we examine the nexus between individual-
specific information on prices and expectation updating. We start by extracting the proportion
of survey participants that have updated their inflation forecasts in the second interview: Fig-
ure 4 reports the resulting time-varying frequency of expectation updating, together with CPI
inflation. The two series display positive co-movement, though the former is more volatile. It
is interesting to note that, on average, expectation updating takes place at a faster pace when
23 It is interesting to note that for the sub-sample 1984Q1-2004Q4 favorable news actually contribute at re-
stricting the gap, while unfavorable news still exert a positive effect (see Table A3(b) in Appendix A).
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inflation is higher and more volatile, as in the first part of the sample. Notably, the time-varying
frequency reaches its maximum only in two episodes, namely March 1980 (i.e., the highest peak
in the rate of inflation) and November 1989.24
On average, 74.9% of the respondents do update their inflation forecasts in the second
interview. Among these, 53.2% (46.8%) adjust their expectations downwards (upwards).25
Thus, the fraction of consumers that revise their forecasts is significantly greater than the
proportion of those who have perceived news about inflation, as well as than the absorption
rate estimated by Carroll. Further insights come from inspecting the direction of expectation
updating. We compare the fraction of respondents that revise their expectations towards the
SPF mean forecast with those who move further away in the second interview. Interestingly,
households split evenly into these categories, with 50.8% of the participants revising expectations
in the ‘right’ direction. The picture is virtually unchanged even if we consider ‘informed’
households: in this case, the percentage of those who update expectations towards the SPF
benchmark is 49.6%.26 We also compute the average forecast error for those consumers who
update their expectations and those who do not, as well as for households who report some
recent news on prices and those who do not (see Table 4). Surprisingly, the average forecast
error is about 12% higher when consumers update their forecasts, no matter whether they are
aware of some recent changes in prices. Table 4 also implies that the average forecast error is
significantly higher when consumers report of recent changes in prices, as compared to when
they do not.
Insert Figure 4 here
Insert Table 4 here
The key message we retrieve from the investigation of the household-level statistics is that
having some information at hand does not necessarily reflect into more accurate forecasts. Armed
with this preliminary evidence, a main task of our analysis is to examine in closer detail the
interconnection between the degree of receptiveness to news about inflation and the probability
24 In early 1980, Volcker’s new FED policy began to bite. U.S. interest rates started to increase substantially,
with the prime rate hitting 20% in April 1980. As to the second episode, this might reflect increasing fears of
contraction in economic activity, as then happened in the early 1990s.
25Unless otherwise indicated, the proportion of MS participants we report in this section (conditional on
alternative attributes) are statistically different at the 1% level of significance.
26We also consider expectation updating ‘towards’the CPI rate of inflation. In this case only 50.5% of the MS
interviewees that update their forecasts do revise them in the ‘right’direction. This figure drops to 49% when
we consider agents that have heard of changes in prices, though this fraction is statistically lower than 50% only
at the 10% level of significance.
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that households revise their expectations. We specify a binary response model of the process
underlying expectation updating at the household-level. The following variable is defined:
zi =
 1 if z
∗
i > 0
0 if z∗i ≤ 0
, i = 1, 2, ..., N, (6)
where z∗i is the latent variable that accounts for consumers’expectation updating. Its discrete
counterpart, zi, takes value one if the ith respondent has updated her expectations from the first
interview, and zero otherwise. Since individuals are interviewed only twice, the only reference
term to determine whether expectation updating has taken place is represented by the response





Nρ+ πδ + πFϑ+ xiγ + ui, (7)
where α is a constant, NEWSPi is an individual-specific indicator of news perception (which
equals one if the interviewee has heard of recent changes in prices and zero otherwise), NEWSN
indexes the intensity of news coverage, π denotes the last observed CPI inflation rate,27 πF is
the mean forecast from the SPF, xi is a vector of socio-demographic characteristics (such as
gender, age, income, education, race, marital status, location in the US and some interaction
terms) and ui is normally distributed. A word of caution is in order before we proceed with the
analysis. As described in Section 2, sample selection is designed so that not all initial survey
respondents are re-interviewed. Moreover, though the SRC tries to ensure that first interviews
are a random sub-sample of the population, not all respondents who are selected for a second
interview agree to participate. We label the resulting drop off as ‘interview attrition’. It is also
possible to identify a fraction of respondents that participate in the second interview but do
not provide a year-ahead inflation expectation. The resulting drop off is usually referred to as
‘question attrition’. To account for these potential sources of bias, we implement the Heckman
correction (Heckman, 1979), a procedure that offers a means of correcting for non-randomly
selected samples.
Insert Tables 5 and 6 here
27We have also considered the possibility that consumers look at alternative inflation measures, such as average
inflation over the 6 months re-interview period. However, we obtain neither qualitatively nor quantitatively
different results.
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The binary response framework provides some support to the sticky information paradigm.
As shown in Tables 5 and 6, hearing news on prices on average increases the probability of
revising inflation forecasts, no matter which news-related variable is considered.28 Also current
inflation and the SPF mean forecast exert a positive impact, though the latter seems to induce
a stronger marginal effect on the probability of revising expectations.
The analysis of household-level data also confirms that an increase in the volume of (available
or perceived) news widens the gap between household forecasts and the SPF mean expectation,
as indicated by the impact of NEWSPi,t in the following regression:
GAPi,t = α+NEWS
P








where GAPSQi,t is the squared difference between the MS household-specific forecast and the
SPF mean inflation forecast, GAPSQ∗i,t is the squared difference between the the MS household-
specific forecast and CPI inflation (at the forecast horizon), hi,t is a vector of all other covariates










component of the error term and Cov (vi, εi,t) = 0. The results from the estimation of (8)
are reported in Tables 7 and 8. Along with NEWSPi , also NEWS
N contributes at widening
both GAPSQi,t and GAPSQ∗i,t. This confirms the evidence obtained with aggregate data
and reflects the fact that the average forecast error is significantly higher when consumers are
informed of recent changes in prices, as displayed by Table 4. It is also important to note
that only (perceived) unfavorable news exert a positive effect on the expectation bias, while
perceiving favorable news does not seem to have a statistically relevant effect.29 As suggested
by Hamilton (2004) and Lamla and Lein (2008), a possible interpretation of these facts is that
media coverage may carry some ‘judgemental’assessment of professional forecasters’projections
that eventually biases household forecasts.
Insert Tables 7 and 8 here
28Tables 5 and 6 report marginal effects for a representative agent with the following characteristics: white
(non Hispanic), married, male, 40 years old, with a high school diploma, with an income in the middle quintile
of the distribution and living in the North-Center of the US.
29Curtin (2005) employs household-level data and reports about asymmetric responses of inflation expectations
to positive and negative changes in actual inflation. He interprets this evidence as signalling the possibility of an
asymmetric response to changes in the perceived credibility of central banks. According to this view, increases
in inflation will more promptly diminish the credibility of central banks, but declines in inflation will only slowly
rebuild lost credibility.
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The econometric and statistical analyses with the MS micro-data provide us with two ele-
ments whose coexistence is problematic for the internal consistency of Carroll’s argument. On
the one hand, hearing news about prices increases the probability that consumers update their
expectations. On the other hand, even if consumers have heard of some recent changes in prices,
expectations are not necessarily revised in the right direction. The last point in particular raises
the problem of investigating in closer detail how expectations are actually revised. To address
this issue we specify the following probit regression:
Pr (yi,2 = 1|wi) = Φ (wiψ) , (10)
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the standard normal distribution, yi,2
is a binary variable that indicates whether the ith respondent’s prediction is greater (yi,2 = 1) or
lower (yi,2 = 0) than professional forecasters’mean prediction in the second interview. Moreover,
wi is the vector of covariates (whose first entry is one), ψ is the vector of parameters. The main
objective of estimating (10) is to understand whether households’potential overprediction (or
underprediction) with respect to the SPF mean forecast in the first round interview affects the
probability of overpredicting (or underpredicting) in the second interview.30 To this end, we
include yi,1 in wi. We are also interested in understanding whether news absorption exerts any
asymmetric impact depending on whether consumers have overpredicted or underpredicted in




Insert Tables 9 and 10 here
Tables 9 and 10 show that overprediction is inertial, as yi,1 exerts a positive marginal effect
on the probability that yi,2 = 1. Also NEWSPi has a positive effect, while the interaction term
NEWSPi ×yi,1 has no statistically meaningful impact on the probability of overpredicting, unless
it appears as the only regressor in wi, together with yi,1 and the vector of control variables.31
The general tone of the news that consumers have perceived seems to have an asymmetric effect,
as unfavorable news increase the chances of overpredicting, while favorable news have a negative
marginal effect. Finally, the actual rate of inflation exerts a positive impact on the chances that
yi,2 = 1, which signals a certain overreaction to marginal variations in the inflation outlook.
30Only for 13.7% of the consumers who update their forecast from the first interview we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that they adopt the SPF mean forecast.
31Otherwise, NEWSN does not exert a statistically significant impact when also NEWSPi appears in wi.
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Such a pessimistic attitude may indeed play a role in preventing households from making an
effi cient use of the information they perceive and adjust their expectations towards the SPF
mean forecast.
With this picture at hand, a last important question needs to be addressed: how can we
explain the coexistence of an updating mechanism à la Carroll —which is generally supported
by the analysis with aggregate data —with the fact that household-level data are not consistent
with the epidemiological hypothesis? To rationalize these mutually contradicting phenomena,
one could argue that even though about half of the respondents update their expectations in the
‘wrong’direction, yet the magnitude of their adjustments implies that the ‘aggregate revision’
moves in the right direction.32 To test this hypothesis we compute, for all respondents that
update their forecasts in the second interview, the average distance between their expectations
and the SPF mean forecast, both in the first and the second interview. The statistics show that
the average prediction gap narrows down by about 33.5% from the first to the second survey
response, implying that the aggregate revision is on average dominated by the adjustment of
those who update correctly, as compared with those that shift their projections further away
from the SPF mean forecast.33 The main implication of this result is that the empirical relevance
of the model behind Equation (1) may actually result as a simple statistical artifact. In fact,
the driving force of the expectation updating mechanism underlying consumers’mean forecast
is represented by the size of the adjustment in household-level expectations, rather than by the
epidemiological mechanism à la Carroll.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has extensively tested the epidemiological foundations of the sticky information
model. We provide at best weak support to the view according to which consumers update their
forecasts from the media, which are assumed to transmit professional forecasters’projections.
An average of about 75% of the survey respondents revise their inflation forecasts with respect
to their first interview, which has occurred six months before the second one. However, in
32Another possible explanation relies on the role of the predictions of those who are interviewed for the first
time. In fact, it may be the case that even if incumbents’expectation updating does not work as predicted by
Carroll, new respondents’predictions influence the dynamics of the overall average forecast. However, we test
this hypothesis and find no statistical evidence that supports it.
33This mechanism turns out to be reinforced if these statistics include those respondents who do not update
their predictions between the first and second interview. This is because the SPF mean forecast slightly decreases
over time, driving down the average prediction gap from the first to the second interview.
17
each quarter only 5.8% of the households display some receptiveness to news on prices. Thus,
we observe a fundamental disconnection between news on inflation and consumers’expectation
updating. In fact, just a small fraction of those consumers who update their forecasts (13.7%)
seem to revise expectation in accordance with the epidemiological model.
A key result is that hearing news on prices does not necessarily help at producing better
forecasts, though it increases the probability that consumers revise their expectations. Con-
sumers’ expectation updating is also characterized by a marked degree of pessimism, which
shows at different stages of the analysis. Importantly, the rate of CPI inflation and households’
receptiveness to unfavorable news on prices exert a positive effect on the expectation gap be-
tween households’and professional forecasters’ expectations. These factors also increase the
likelihood that households persistently produce higher forecasts than professional forecasters
mean expectation. Along with households’pessimistic attitude two alternative interpretations
may be put forward to explain why consumers display stronger perception of unfavorable rather
than favorable news on prices, and why these news exert a negative impact on the accuracy of
their forecasts. On the one hand, news coverage may be biased by the views of players in the
media, so that the views of professional forecasters are not reported objectively. On the other
hand, as discussed by a number of contributors, professional forecasters often produce biased
projections and, even if their views are objectively transmitted by the media, they may induce
further distortions in consumers’forecasts. These considerations altogether emphasize the role
of the epidemiological model of expectation formation as a transmission channel of potentially
biased forecasts. In addition, the existence of a substantial fraction of consumers who do not
adjust their forecasts towards professional forecasters’mean expectation is likely to induce an
omitted-variable bias in Carroll’s estimates of the absorption rate.
Our study has some relevant implications for evaluating the cost of disinflations and the role
of communication and credibility in monetary policy. As to the first aspect, a number of authors
stress the importance of quantifying the cost of disinflations in contexts where expectations
are updated in a staggered fashion (e.g., Mankiw and Reis, 2001, 2002; Carroll, 2003, 2006).
Time-varying measures of the frequency of expectation updating as the one we retrieve from
household-level data can be used to explore these issues. In fact, in agreement with the rational
inattention argument that consumers should be more intensely focused on news on inflation and
inflation-fighting policies during periods of high inflation, we show that consumers’frequency of
expectation updating has actually reached its maximum right before Volcker’s disinflationary
18
policy kicked in during the 1980s. As to the role of communication in policy making, Carroll
suggests that credibility among experts may not be suffi cient to achieve a desired inflationary
outcome and suggests that the views of the experts need to be communicated effectively to
the population to become effective. These may certainly be important aspects, provided that
experts produce effi cient forecasts and these are objectively reported in the media. Nevertheless,
we should also account for the possibility that consumers do not necessarily follow experts’views
or they may not make an effi cient use of the information they retrieve from the media.
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Figure 4: Time-Varying Frequency of Expectation Updating.
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t+3|t−1 + α3πt−1 + vt.
Equations
1 2 3 4 5
α0 0.245 0.373*
(0.177) (0.218)
α1 0.280*** 0.279*** 0.278*** 0.285***
(0.069) (0.067) (0.069) (0.065)
α2 0.769*** 0.726*** 0.784*** 0.642*** 1.018***
(0.059) (0.069) (0.061) (0.091) (0.040)
α3 -0.015 0.059 -0.036
(0.042) (0.049) (0.050)
Test α1 + α2 = 1 α0 = 0 α1 + α2 + α3 = 1 α2 + α3 = 1
p-value 0.006 0.169 0.012 0.328
T 130 130 130 130 130
R2 0.985 0.911 0.985 0.912 0.982
Notes: πCt+4|t and π
F
t+4|t are the (four quarters-ahead) mean expectations from the Michigan Survey and the
Survey of Professional Forecasters in period t, respectively; πt−1 is the most recently published annual inflation
rate as of time t. Robust standard errors computed with the Huber-White sandwich estimator are reported in
parentheses. ∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ indicates significance at the 1/5/10% level.
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γ0 0.027 2.510** -0.294 -1.034 -2.153** -1.079 2.091 -3.632**
(0.864) (1.119) (0.437) (1.267) (1.062) (1.308) (1.537) (1.772)
γ1 0.236** 0.046 0.192* -0.018 -0.330 0.294*
(0.115) (0.076) (0.098) (0.124) (0.209) (0.149)
γ2 0.435*** 0.727** 0.481*** 0.773** -0.112 1.126**
(0.110) (0.282) (0.119) (0.334) (0.307) (0.453)
γ3 0.073* -0.043
(0.042) (0.027)
T 123 122 131 130 123 122 123 122
R2 0.057 0.001 0.364 0.320 0.455 0.323 0.561 0.335
Notes: GAP t={GAPSQt,GAPSQ
∗
t }, where GAPSQt is the squared difference between the MS and SPF
mean inflation forecasts and GAPSQ∗t is the squared difference between the MS mean inflation forecast and
CPI inflation (at the forecast horizon); NEWSPt is the fraction of MS participants that have heard of favorable
or unfavorable changes prices in the period before the interview; NEWSNt is an index of the intensity of news
coverage of inflation in the New York Times and the Washington Post. Robust standard errors computed with
the Huber-White sandwich estimator are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ indicates significance at the 1/5/10%
level.
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Table 3: Favorable and Unfavorable News, Expectation Updating and Forecast Accuracy.








αU1 0.290*** γ0 2.503*** 3.680*** 0.107 -0.352 0.191 -0.222
(0.082) (0.446) (0.851) (0.332) (0.975) (0.311) (1.052)
αF1 0.284*** γ
F
1 -0.230 -0.392 -0.069 -0.106
(0.068) (0.153) (0.385) (0.101) (0.297)
αU2 0.775*** γ
U
1 0.454*** 0.758*** 0.453*** 0.756***
(0.070) (0.112) (0.285) (0.112) (0.286)
αF2 0.714***
(0.061)
T 130 T 131 130 131 130 131 130
R2 0.986 R2 0.005 0.005 0.391 0.343 0.392 0.344
Notes: Table 3(a) reports the OLS estimates of Equation (4); Table 3(b) reports the OLS estimates from Equation
(5). Robust standard errors computed with the Huber-White sandwich estimator are reported in parentheses.
∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ indicates significance at the 1/5/10% level.
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Table 4: Predictive Accuracy, Expectation Updating and News Perception.
AFE AFE Conditional on News
YES NO
Updated Forecast 3.09 3.33 3.10
Forecast Stays the Same 2.76 2.99 2.77
Notes: Table 4 reports the average forecast error (AFE) implied by household-level data: this is computed both for
agents that have updated their forecast with respect to the first interview (first row, labelled ‘Updated Forecast’)
and those that have not revised their forecasts (second row, labelled ‘Forecast Stays the Same’). Moreover, we
compute the average forecast error for those who have heard of recent changes in prices (column labelled "AFE
Conditional on News-YES") and those who have not (column labelled "AFE Conditional on News-NO").
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Table 5: Determinants of Expectation Updating at the Household-Level.
Models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
NEWSPi 0.042*** 0.031*** 0.035*** 0.034***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
NEWSN 0.004*** -0.001
(0.0004) (0.001)




Controls yes yes yes yes yes
SSC 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.005*** 0.050* 0.000***





204*** 260*** 346*** 353*** 333***
Notes: Table 5 reports the marginal partial effects from the estimation of Pr(zi= 1|hi) = Φ (hiξ), where
Φ(·) is the CDF of the standard normal distribution, hi is the vector of covariates and ξ is a vector of coeffi cients;
zi, takes value one if the i
th respondent has updated her expectations from the first interview and zero otherwise.
The vector hi includes: NEWS
P
i , which is an individual-specific indicator of news perception (this equals one
if the interviewee has heard of changes in prices in the last few months before the interview and zero otherwise);
NEWSN , that is an index of the intensity of news coverage of inflation in the New York Times and the
Washington Post; π, which denotes the last observed CPI inflation rate; πF , the mean forecast from the the
Survey of Professional Forecasters at the time the individual is interviewed; a vector xi of control variables,
where we include information on the socio-demographic characteristics of the MS respondents (such as gender,
age, income, education, race, marital status, location in the US), as well as a number of interaction terms among
them. To account for the presence of question attrition, we perform a sample selection correction test: SSC
stands for the p-value of the Wald test of independence from the sample selection equation (which includes as
regressors some socio-demographic characteristics as well as the tone of the news consumers have heard). A
constant has been included in all regressions. Standard errors are calculated with the delta method (Oehlert,
1992) and are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ indicates significance at the 1/5/10% level.
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Table 6: Determinants of Expectation Updating at the Household-Level.
Models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
NEWSPi 0.033*** 0.027*** 0.029*** 0.030***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.001) (0.007)
NEWSN 0.003*** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)




Controls yes yes yes yes yes
SSC 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.269 0.255 0.352





825*** 466*** 435*** 445*** 456***
Notes: Table 6 reports the marginal partial effects from the estimation of Pr(zi= 1|hi) = Φ (hiξ), where
Φ(·) is the CDF of the standard normal distribution, hi is the vector of covariates and ξ is a vector of coeffi cients;
zi, takes value one if the i
th respondent has updated her expectations from the first interview and zero otherwise.
The vector hi includes: NEWS
P
i , which is an individual-specific indicator of news perception (this equals one
if the interviewee has heard of changes in prices in the last few months before the interview and zero otherwise);
NEWSN , that is an index of the intensity of news coverage of inflation in the New York Times and the
Washington Post; π, which denotes the last observed CPI inflation rate; πF , the mean forecast from the the
Survey of Professional Forecasters at the time the individual is interviewed; a vector xi of control variables,
where we include information on the socio-demographic characteristics of the MS respondents (such as gender,
age, income, education, race, marital status, location in the US), as well as a number of interaction terms among
them. To account for the presence of interview attrition, we perform a sample selection correction test: SSC
stands for the p-value of the Wald test of independence from the sample selection equation (which includes as
regressors some socio-demographic characteristics as well as the tone of the news consumers have heard). A
constant has been included in all regressions. Standard errors are calculated with the delta method (Oehlert,
1992) and are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ indicates significance at the 1/5/10% level.
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Table 7: ‘GAP’Linear Regressions (Random Effects).
Equations
GAPSQi,t GAPSQi,t GAPSQi,t GAPSQi,t GAPSQi,t
Constant 31.125*** 11.720*** 12.817*** 10.305*** 16.693***
(1.483) (1.573) (1.555) (1.595) (1.557)












Controls yes yes yes yes yes





3,388*** 4,221*** 4,654*** 4,360*** 5,331***
Notes: We estimate (8) by feasible GLS. GAPSQi,t is the squared difference between the MS household-
specific forecast and the SPF mean inflation forecast; NEWSPi,t is an individual-specific indicator of news
perception (which equals one if the interviewee has heard of changes in prices in the last few months and zero
otherwise); NEWSP,Fi,t and NEWS
P,U
i,t are individual-specific responses about the content of the news the
survey participant has heard about; NEWSNt is an index of the intensity of news coverage of inflation in the
New York Times and the Washington Post; πt−1 denotes the last observed CPI inflation rate as of time t; πFt+12|t
is the (twelve months-ahaed) mean forecast from the Survey of Professional Forecasters; the vector of control
variables includes information on the socio-demographic characteristics of the ith respondent (such as gender,
age, income, education, race, marital status, location in the US), as well as some interaction terms among these
characteristics. Clustered standard errors (computed at the individual level through the sandwich estimator) are
reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ indicates significance at the 1/5/10% level.
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Constant 32.017*** 10.342*** 10.646*** 11.658*** 15.498***
(1.580) (1.659) (1.656) (1.680) (1.659)












Controls yes yes yes yes yes





3,480*** 4,496*** 5,341*** 4,647*** 7,023***
Notes: We estimate (8) by feasible GLS. GAPSQ∗i,t is the squared difference between the MS household-
specific forecast and CPI inflation (at the forecast horizon); NEWSPi,t is an individual-specific indicator of
news perception (which equals one if the interviewee has heard of changes in prices in the last few months and
zero otherwise); NEWSP,Fi,t and NEWS
P,U
i,t are individual-specific responses about the content of the news
the survey participant has heard about; NEWSNt is an index of the intensity of news coverage of inflation in
the New York Times and the Washington Post; πt−1 denotes the last observed CPI inflation rate as of time
t; πFt+12|t is the (twelve months-ahaed) mean forecast from the Survey of Professional Forecasters; the vector
of control variables includes information on the socio-demographic characteristics of the ith respondent (such
as gender, age, income, education, race, marital status, location in the US), as well as some interaction terms
among these characteristics. Clustered standard errors (computed at the individual level through the sandwich
estimator) are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ indicates significance at the 1/5/10% level.
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Table 9: Determinants of the Forecast Bias at the Household-Level.
Models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
yi,1 0.279*** 0.263*** 0.264*** 0.258*** 0.265*** 0.272*** 0.277***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
π 0.002*** 0.022*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.035***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
πF -0.081*** -0.078*** -0.081***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
NEWSPi 0.134*** 0.109*** 0.115*** 0.139***







NEWSPi × yi,1 -0.011 0.119*** -0.003
(0.018) (0.013) (0.018)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
SSC 0.006*** 0.000*** 0.074* 0.038** 0.078* 0.000*** 0.002***





5,374*** 6,992*** 6,579*** 5,203*** 6,630*** 4,936*** 5,487***
Notes: Table 9 reports the marginal partial effects from the estimation of Pr(yi,2 = 1|wi) = Φ (wiψ),
where Φ (·) is the CDF of the standard normal distribution, wi is the vector of covariates and ψ is a vector of
coeffi cients; yi,2 is a binary variable that indicates whether the i
th respondent’s prediction is greater (yi,2= 1) or
lower (yi,2= 0) than professional forecasters’mean prediction in the second interview. The vector wi includes:
the binary variable yi,1, which indicates whether the i
th respondent’s prediction has been greater (yi,1= 1)
or lower (yi,1= 0) than professional forecasters’mean prediction in the first interview; NEWS
P
i , which is
an individual-specific indicator of news perception (which equals one if the interviewee has heard of changes in
prices in the last few months before the interview and zero otherwise); NEWSN is an index of the intensity
of news coverage of inflation in the New York Times and the Washington Post; NEWSP,Fi,t and NEWS
P,U
i,t
are individual-specific responses about the content of the news the survey participant has heard about; π, which
denotes the last observed CPI inflation rate; πF , which denotes the (twelve months-ahaed) mean forecast from
the Survey of Professional Forecasters; a vector xi of control variables, where we include information on the
socio-demographic characteristics (such as gender, age, income, education, race, marital status, location in the
US), as well as a number of interaction terms among them. re we include information on the socio-demographic
characteristics of the MS respondents (such as gender, age, income, education, race, marital status, location in
the US), as well as a number of interaction terms among them. To account for the presence of question attrition,
we perform a sample selection correction test: SSC stands for the p-value of the Wald test of independence
from the sample selection equation (which includes as regressors some socio-demographic characteristics as well
as the tone of the news consumers have heard). A constant has been included in all regressions. Standard
errors are calculated with the delta method (Oehlert, 1992) and are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ indicates
significance at the 1/5/10% level.
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Table 10: Determinants of the Forecast Bias at the Household-Level.
Models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
yi,1 0.248*** 0.199*** 0.220*** 0.231*** 0.227*** 0.214*** 0.244***
(0.015) (0.005) (0.011) (0.016) (0.016) (0.007) (0.016)
π 0.002*** 0.017*** 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.030***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
πF -0.067*** -0.070*** -0.069***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
NEWSPi 0.115*** 0.084*** 0.098*** 0.120***







NEWSPi × yi,1 -0.012 0.080*** -0.008
(0.011) (0.011) (0.015)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
SSC 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000***





4,620*** 4,929*** 4,510*** 4,792*** 4,672*** 4,433*** 4,487***
Notes: Table 10 reports the marginal partial effects from the estimation of Pr(yi,2 = 1|wi) = Φ (wiψ),
where Φ (·) is the CDF of the standard normal distribution, wi is the vector of covariates and ψ is a vector of
coeffi cients; yi,2 is a binary variable that indicates whether the i
th respondent’s prediction is greater (yi,2= 1) or
lower (yi,2= 0) than professional forecasters’mean prediction in the second interview. The vector wi includes:
the binary variable yi,1, which indicates whether the i
th respondent’s prediction has been greater (yi,1= 1)
or lower (yi,1= 0) than professional forecasters’mean prediction in the first interview; NEWS
P
i , which is
an individual-specific indicator of news perception (which equals one if the interviewee has heard of changes in
prices in the last few months before the interview and zero otherwise); NEWSN is an index of the intensity
of news coverage of inflation in the New York Times and the Washington Post; NEWSP,Fi,t and NEWS
P,U
i,t
are individual-specific responses about the content of the news the survey participant has heard about; π, which
denotes the last observed CPI inflation rate; πF , which denotes the (twelve months-ahaed) mean forecast from
the Survey of Professional Forecasters; a vector xi of control variables, where we include information on the
socio-demographic characteristics (such as gender, age, income, education, race, marital status, location in the
US), as well as a number of interaction terms among them. To account for the presence of interview attrition, we
perform a sample selection correction test: SSC stands for the p-value of the Wald test of independence from
the sample selection equation (which includes as regressors some socio-demographic characteristics as well as the
tone of the news consumers have heard). A constant has been included in all regressions. Standard errors are
calculated with the delta method (Oehlert, 1992) and are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ indicates significance
at the 1/5/10% level.
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Appendix A: Analysis on the 1984-2004 Sample




t+3|t−1 + α3πt−1 + vt.
Equations
1 2 3 4 5
α0 0.780*** 0.885***
(0.246) (0.258)
α1 0.261*** 0.240*** 0.263*** 0.244***
(0.058) (0.057) (0.059) (0.058)
α2 0.780*** 0.608*** 0.754*** 0.495*** 0.980***
(0.050) (0.068) (0.073) (0.099) (0.058)
α3 0.030 0.104 0.012
(0.066) (0.067) (0.074)
Test α1 + α2 = 1 α0 = 0 α1 + α2 + α3 = 1 α2 + α3 = 1
p-value 0.009 0.002 0.042 0.714
T 94 94 94 94 94
R2 0.986 0.669 0.986 0.676 0.984
Notes: πCt+4|t and π
F
t+4|t are the (four quarters-ahead) mean expectations from the Michigan Survey and the
Survey of Professional Forecasters in period t, respectively; πt−1 is the most recently published annual inflation
rate as of time t. Robust standard errors computed with the Huber-White sandwich estimator are reported in
parentheses. ∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ indicates significance at the 1/5/10% level.
34




















γ0 1.247*** 1.213** 0.431*** 1.317*** 0.398 0.681 0.025 -0.642
(0.298) (0.593) (0.111) (0.326) (0.272) (0.609) (0.347) (0.800)
γ1 -0.022 0.055 0.004 0.071 0.056 0.257**
(0.031) (0.062) (0.030) (0.062) (0.051) (0.106)
γ2 0.154*** 0.089 0.154*** 0.097 0.245** 0.418**
(0.027) (0.066) (0.028) (0.066) (0.093) (0.186)
γ3 -0.013 -0.047*
(0.015) (0.026)
T 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94
R2 0.005 0.005 0.359 0.023 0.360 0.032 0.372 0.063
Notes: GAP t={GAPSQt,GAPSQ
∗
t }, where GAPSQt is the squared difference between the MS and SPF
mean inflation forecasts and GAPSQ∗t is the squared difference between the MS mean inflation forecast and
CPI inflation (at the forecast horizon); NEWSPt is the fraction of MS participants that have heard of favorable
or unfavorable changes prices in the period before the interview; NEWSNt is an index of the intensity of news
coverage of inflation in the New York Times and the Washington Post. Robust standard errors computed with
the Huber-White sandwich estimator are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ indicates significance at the 1/5/10%
level.
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Table A3: Favorable and Unfavorable News, Expectation Updating and Forecast Accuracy.








αU1 0.254*** γ0 1.278*** 1.904*** 0.529*** 1.346*** 0.678*** 1.540***
(0.093) (0.145) (0.279) (0.092) (0.278) (0.106) (0.329)
αF1 0.304*** γ
F
1 -0.216*** -0.219** -0.127** -0.165
(0.065) (0.071) (0.103) (0.048) (0.100)
αU2 0.816*** γ
U
1 0.174*** 0.110* 0.167*** 0.101
(0.078) (0.026) (0.066) (0.026) (0.067)
αF2 0.700***
(0.060)
T 94 T 94 94 94 94 94 94
R2 0.988 R2 0.068 0.014 0.460 0.035 0.483 0.043
Notes: Table A3(a) reports the OLS estimates of Equation (4); Table A3(b) reports the OLS estimates from
Equation (5). Robust standard errors computed with the Huber-White sandwich estimator are reported in
parentheses. ∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ indicates significance at the 1/5/10% level.
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Table A4: Determinants of Expectation Updating at the Household-Level.
Models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
NEWSPi 0.044*** 0.040*** 0.042*** 0.041***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.007)
NEWSN 0.002** -0.002
(0.001) (0.001)




Controls yes yes yes yes yes
SSC 0.561 0.343 0.676 0.586 0.624





131*** 134*** 150*** 162*** 164***
Notes: Table A4 reports the marginal partial effects from the estimation of Pr(zi= 1|hi) = Φ (hiξ), where
Φ(·) is the CDF of the standard normal distribution, hi is the vector of covariates and ξ is a vector of coeffi cients;
zi, takes value one if the i
th respondent has updated her expectations from the first interview and zero otherwise.
The vector hi includes: NEWS
P
i , which is an individual-specific indicator of news perception (this equals one
if the interviewee has heard of changes in prices in the last few months before the interview and zero otherwise);
NEWSN , that is an index of the intensity of news coverage of inflation in the New York Times and the
Washington Post; π, which denotes the last observed CPI inflation rate; πF , the mean forecast from the the
Survey of Professional Forecasters at the time the individual is interviewed; a vector xi of control variables,
where we include information on the socio-demographic characteristics of the MS respondents (such as gender,
age, income, education, race, marital status, location in the US), as well as a number of interaction terms among
them. To account for the presence of question attrition, we perform a sample selection correction test: SSC
stands for the p-value of the Wald test of independence from the sample selection equation (which includes as
regressors some socio-demographic characteristics as well as the tone of the news consumers have heard). A
constant has been included in all regressions. Standard errors are calculated with the delta method (Oehlert,
1992) and are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ indicates significance at the 1/5/10% level.
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Table A5: Determinants of Expectation Updating at the Household-Level.
Models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
NEWSPi 0.033*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.031***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
NEWSN 0.001** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)




Controls yes yes yes yes yes
SSC 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.001***





606*** 612*** 606*** 618*** 620***
Notes: Table A5 reports the marginal partial effects from the estimation of Pr(zi= 1|hi) = Φ (hiξ), where
Φ(·) is the CDF of the standard normal distribution, hi is the vector of covariates and ξ is a vector of coeffi cients;
zi, takes value one if the i
th respondent has updated her expectations from the first interview and zero otherwise.
The vector hi includes: NEWS
P
i , which is an individual-specific indicator of news perception (this equals one
if the interviewee has heard of changes in prices in the last few months before the interview and zero otherwise);
NEWSN , that is an index of the intensity of news coverage of inflation in the New York Times and the
Washington Post; π, which denotes the last observed CPI inflation rate; πF , the mean forecast from the the
Survey of Professional Forecasters at the time the individual is interviewed; a vector xi of control variables,
where we include information on the socio-demographic characteristics of the MS respondents (such as gender,
age, income, education, race, marital status, location in the US), as well as a number of interaction terms among
them. To account for the presence of interview attrition, we perform a sample selection correction test: SSC
stands for the p-value of the Wald test of independence from the sample selection equation (which includes as
regressors some socio-demographic characteristics as well as the tone of the news consumers have heard). A
constant has been included in all regressions. Standard errors are calculated with the delta method (Oehlert,
1992) and are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ indicates significance at the 1/5/10% level.
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Table A6: ‘GAP’Linear Regressions (Random Effects).
Equations
GAPSQi,t GAPSQi,t GAPSQi,t GAPSQi,t GAPSQi,t
Constant 23.648*** 17.327*** 15.380*** 14.586*** 13.235***
(1.758) (1.846) (1.895) (1.893) (1.898)












Controls yes yes yes yes yes





2,274*** 2,275*** 2,327*** 2,329*** 2,354***
Notes: We estimate (8) by feasible GLS. GAPSQi,t is the squared difference between the MS household-
specific forecast and the SPF mean inflation forecast; NEWSPi,t is an individual-specific indicator of news
perception (which equals one if the interviewee has heard of changes in prices in the last few months and zero
otherwise); NEWSP,Fi,t and NEWS
P,U
i,t are individual-specific responses about the content of the news the
survey participant has heard about; NEWSNt is an index of the intensity of news coverage of inflation in the
New York Times and the Washington Post; πt−1 denotes the last observed CPI inflation rate as of time t; πFt+12|t
is the (twelve months-ahaed) mean forecast from the Survey of Professional Forecasters; the vector of control
variables includes information on the socio-demographic characteristics of the ith respondent (such as gender,
age, income, education, race, marital status, location in the US), as well as some interaction terms among these
characteristics. Clustered standard errors (computed at the individual level through the sandwich estimator) are
reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ indicates significance at the 1/5/10% level.
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Constant 25.207*** 18.292*** 17.295*** 16.193*** 14.589***
(1.877) (1.963) (2.013) (2.010) (2.013)












Controls yes yes yes yes yes





2,207*** 2,215*** 2,253*** 2,253*** 2,315***
Notes: We estimate (8) by feasible GLS. GAPSQ∗i,t is the squared difference between the MS household-
specific forecast and CPI inflation (at the forecast horizon); NEWSPi,t is an individual-specific indicator of
news perception (which equals one if the interviewee has heard of changes in prices in the last few months and
zero otherwise); NEWSP,Fi,t and NEWS
P,U
i,t are individual-specific responses about the content of the news
the survey participant has heard about; NEWSNt is an index of the intensity of news coverage of inflation in
the New York Times and the Washington Post; πt−1 denotes the last observed CPI inflation rate as of time
t; πFt+12|t is the (twelve months-ahaed) mean forecast from the Survey of Professional Forecasters; the vector
of control variables includes information on the socio-demographic characteristics of the ith respondent (such
as gender, age, income, education, race, marital status, location in the US), as well as some interaction terms
among these characteristics. Clustered standard errors (computed at the individual level through the sandwich
estimator) are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ indicates significance at the 1/5/10% level.
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Table A8: Determinants of the Forecast Bias at the Household-Level.
Models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
yi,1 0.265*** 0.260*** 0.251*** 0.251*** 0.250*** 0.263*** 0.265***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
π -0.000 0.015*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
πF -0.084*** -0.084*** -0.084***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
NEWSPi 0.079*** 0.071*** 0.069*** 0.075***







NEWSPi × yi,1 0.004 0.081*** 0.008
(0.026) (0.019) (0.027)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
SSC 0.006*** 0.000*** 0.003*** 0.012** 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.006***





3,694*** 3,980*** 3,778*** 3,742*** 3,781*** 3,964*** 3,715***
Notes: Table A8 reports the marginal partial effects from the estimation of Pr(yi,2 = 1|wi) = Φ (wiψ),
where Φ (·) is the CDF of the standard normal distribution, wi is the vector of covariates and ψ is a vector of
coeffi cients; yi,2 is a binary variable that indicates whether the i
th respondent’s prediction is greater (yi,2= 1) or
lower (yi,2= 0) than professional forecasters’mean prediction in the second interview. The vector wi includes:
the binary variable yi,1, which indicates whether the i
th respondent’s prediction has been greater (yi,1= 1)
or lower (yi,1= 0) than professional forecasters’mean prediction in the first interview; NEWS
P
i , which is
an individual-specific indicator of news perception (which equals one if the interviewee has heard of changes in
prices in the last few months before the interview and zero otherwise); NEWSN is an index of the intensity
of news coverage of inflation in the New York Times and the Washington Post; NEWSP,Fi,t and NEWS
P,U
i,t
are individual-specific responses about the content of the news the survey participant has heard about; π, which
denotes the last observed CPI inflation rate; πF , which denotes the (twelve months-ahaed) mean forecast from
the Survey of Professional Forecasters; a vector xi of control variables, where we include information on the
socio-demographic characteristics (such as gender, age, income, education, race, marital status, location in the
US), as well as a number of interaction terms among them. To account for the presence of question attrition, we
perform a sample selection correction test: SSC stands for the p-value of the Wald test of independence from
the sample selection equation (which includes as regressors some socio-demographic characteristics as well as the
tone of the news consumers have heard). A constant has been included in all regressions. Standard errors are
calculated with the delta method (Oehlert, 1992) and are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ indicates significance
at the 1/5/10% level.
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Table A9: Determinants of the Forecast Bias at the Household-Level.
Models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
yi,1 0.222*** 0.211*** 0.223*** 0.230*** 0.229*** 0.219*** 0.222***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011)
π 0.000 0.012*** 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.030***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
πF -0.075*** -0.077*** -0.077***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
NEWSPi 0.068*** 0.065*** 0.066*** 0.068***







NEWSPi × yi,1 0.000 0.064*** -0.000
(0.024) (0.016) (0.022)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
SSC 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.004** 0.004*** 0.000*** 0.000***





2,758*** 2,779*** 3,242*** 3,472*** 3,437*** 2,737*** 2,758***
Notes: Table A9 reports the marginal partial effects from the estimation of Pr(yi,2 = 1|wi) = Φ (wiψ),
where Φ (·) is the CDF of the standard normal distribution, wi is the vector of covariates and ψ is a vector of
coeffi cients; yi,2 is a binary variable that indicates whether the i
th respondent’s prediction is greater (yi,2= 1) or
lower (yi,2= 0) than professional forecasters’mean prediction in the second interview. The vector wi includes:
the binary variable yi,1, which indicates whether the i
th respondent’s prediction has been greater (yi,1= 1)
or lower (yi,1= 0) than professional forecasters’mean prediction in the first interview; NEWS
P
i , which is
an individual-specific indicator of news perception (which equals one if the interviewee has heard of changes in
prices in the last few months before the interview and zero otherwise); NEWSN is an index of the intensity
of news coverage of inflation in the New York Times and the Washington Post; NEWSP,Fi,t and NEWS
P,U
i,t
are individual-specific responses about the content of the news the survey participant has heard about; π, which
denotes the last observed CPI inflation rate; πF , which denotes the (twelve months-ahaed) mean forecast from
the Survey of Professional Forecasters; a vector xi of control variables, where we include information on the
socio-demographic characteristics (such as gender, age, income, education, race, marital status, location in the
US), as well as a number of interaction terms among them. To account for the presence of interview attrition, we
perform a sample selection correction test: SSC stands for the p-value of the Wald test of independence from
the sample selection equation (which includes as regressors some socio-demographic characteristics as well as the
tone of the news consumers have heard). A constant has been included in all regressions. Standard errors are
calculated with the delta method (Oehlert, 1992) and are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ indicates significance
at the 1/5/10% level.
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Appendix B: Pairwise Correlations


























∗∗∗ 0.414∗∗∗ 0.567∗∗∗ 0.799∗∗∗ 1
NEWSP,Ft -0.074 -0.071 0.216
∗ 0.149 0.223∗ 1
NEWSP,Ut 0.626
∗∗∗ 0.586∗∗∗ 0.017 0.973∗∗∗ 0.758∗∗∗ -0.083 1
πt 0.535∗∗∗ 0.177∗ 0.752∗∗∗ 0.501∗∗∗ 0.787∗∗∗ -0.029 0.512∗∗∗ 1
Notes: Table B1 reports pairwise correlations among the variables employed in the regression analysis of Section
3. NPt N
N
t stands for NEWS
P
t ×NEWSNt . ∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ indicates significance at the 0.1/1/5% level.
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Appendix C: Analysis with the Median Forecasts from the MS
and the SPF




t+3|t−1 + α3πt−1 + vt.
Equations
1 2 3 4 5
α0 0.066 0.048
(0.106) (0.134)
α1 0.184*** 0.180*** 0.182*** 0.180***
(0.044) (0.045) (0.044) (0.045)
α2 0.812*** 0.802*** 0.838*** 0.818*** 1.027***
(0.046) (0.048) (0.056) (0.073) (0.039)
α3 -0.021 -0.011 -0.036
(0.031) (0.040) (0.036)
Test α1 + α2 = 1 α0 = 0 α1 + α2 + α3 = 1 α2 + α3 = 1
p-value 0.742 0.533 0.960 0.496
T 130 130 130 130 130
R2 0.986 0.928 0.986 0.928 0.984
Notes: πCt+4|t and π
F
t+4|t are the (four quarters-ahead) median expectations from the Michigan Survey and the
Survey of Professional Forecasters in period t, respectively; πt−1 is the most recently published annual inflation
rate as of time t. Robust standard errors computed with the Huber-White sandwich estimator are reported in
parentheses. ∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ indicates significance at the 1/5/10% level.
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γ0 0.134 1.924** -0.013 -1.611** -0.941** -0.798 0.748 -1.346
(0.385) (0.794) (0.261) (0.793) (0.426) (0.823) (0.556) (1.261)
γ1 0.101** -0.016 0.079* -0.065 -0.129* 0.002
(0.048) (0.049) (0.044) (0.076) (0.070) (0.106)
γ2 0.231*** 0.752*** 0.237*** 0.586** 0.001 0.662**
(0.055) (0.191) (0.059) (0.242) (0.128) (0.334)
γ3 0.029* -0.009
(0.015) (0.020)
T 123 122 131 130 123 122 123 122
R2 0.041 0.000 0.220 0.383 0.432 0.357 0.500 0.358
Notes: GAP t={GAPSQt,GAPSQ
∗
t }, where GAPSQt is the squared difference between the MS and SPF
median inflation forecasts and GAPSQ∗t is the squared difference between the MS median inflation forecast
and CPI inflation (at the forecast horizon); NEWSPt is the fraction of MS participants that have heard of
favorable or unfavorable changes prices in the period before the interview; NEWSNt is an index of the intensity
of news coverage of inflation in the New York Times and the Washington Post. Robust standard errors computed
with the Huber-White sandwich estimator are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ indicates significance at the
1/5/10% level.
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Table C3: Favorable and Unfavorable News, Expectation Updating and Forecast Accuracy.








αU1 0.213*** γ0 1.188*** 3.162*** 0.264 -0.883 0.006 -0.857
(0.050) (0.322) (0.777) (0.232) (0.591) (0.268) (0.718)
αF1 0.191** γ
F
1 0.128 -0.316 0.211 -0.021
(0.076) (0.156) (0.324) (0.159) (0.264)
αU2 0.801*** γ
U
1 0.227*** 0.779*** 0.231*** 0.778***
(0.052) (0.058) (0.192) (0.057) (0.194)
αF2 0.732***
(0.084)
T 130 T 131 130 131 130 131 130
R2 0.987 R2 0.004 0.004 0.210 0.406 0.220 0.406
Notes: Table C3(a) reports the OLS estimates of Equation (4); Table C3(b) reports the OLS estimates from
Equation (5). Robust standard errors computed with the Huber-White sandwich estimator are reported in
parentheses. ∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ indicates significance at the 1/5/10% level.
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